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Abstract
We explore relationships between phenomenology and developmental psychology 
through an in-depth analysis of a particular problem in social cognition: the most 
fundamental access to other minds. In the first part of the paper, we examine how 
developmental science can benefit phenomenology. We explicate the connection 
between cognitive psychology and developmental phenomenology as a form of con-
structive phenomenological psychology. Nativism in contemporary science consti-
tutes a strong impulse to conceive of the possibility of an innate ability to perceive 
others’ mental states, an idea which also has a transcendental implication. In the 
second part, we consider how phenomenology can contribute to developmental sci-
ence. Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation 
of experimental results. Some phenomenological notions and theories can be put 
forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with 
them on grounds of empirical adequacy. For example, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s 
notion of pairing can constitute a viable account of how infants access other minds. 
We outline a number of ways in which this account can be tested and can thus con-
tribute to generating empirical knowledge.
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1 Introduction
Numerous scholars have discussed the relationships between phenomenology and 
developmental science or made concrete use of such relations to support their own 
claims.1 Significant figures of the phenomenological tradition have often talked 
about infants and children, especially to exemplify the fundamental structures of 
the phenomena they were after.2 In this context, the term "fundamental" indicates 
a phenomenon that is presupposed by other phenomena of the same domain (higher 
order phenomena) but does not presuppose them in turn. For example, Husserl and 
Ricoeur reflect on infants to specify what the most primitive and minimal form of 
an action might be; so-called basic actions which make possible all other more com-
plex and sophisticated forms of action that we carry out as children and adults.3
In this paper, we explore relationships between phenomenology and developmen-
tal science through the detailed discussion of a particular example: an in-depth anal-
ysis of the problem of the most fundamental access to other minds. Our discussion 
unfolds according to the idea of “mutual enlightenment” between phenomenology 
and cognitive science.4 The first part of the paper examines how developmental sci-
ence can benefit phenomenology. The second part considers how phenomenology 
can contribute to developmental science.
2  The relevance of developmental science to phenomenology
2.1  A methodology of developmental phenomenology
To elucidate the implications of developmental science for phenomenology, we start 
with some methodological considerations. Phenomenology can approach its field of 
inquiry in at least two ways. First, it can investigate lived experience from within 
the “natural attitude” of ordinary life and science. In the natural attitude we take the 
physical things we deal with as belonging to the world. We also find beings, such 
as human beings and other animals, endowed with lived experience. If we decide to 
carry out a systematic investigation of their lived experience, we embark on the pro-
ject called “phenomenological psychology.”5 This study of “psychic processes” was 
regarded in great esteem by Husserl.6 It is also the one that most strictly concerns 
the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and developmental science. 
Thus, the focus of this paper is on phenomenological psychology.
1 See Bower (2015) for a review.
2 Husserl (1973), Merleau-Ponty (2010) and Ricoeur (1966).
3 Husserl (2006) and Ricoeur (1966).
4 Gallagher and Zahavi (2012).
5 Husserl (1997).
6 Husserl (1989, p. 426).
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A second way of approaching the field of lived experience entails a suspension of 
our acceptance of the natural attitude as the ground of the investigation.7 One of the 
motivations for this suspension is epistemological: to exhibit the epistemic ground 
that supports our belief that each of us is a human being existing in a spatiotem-
poral world with other human beings who are also aware of the same world.8 This 
approach relies on a transcendental attitude rather than a natural attitude.
We emphasize here that there is a systematic connection between transcendental 
phenomenology and phenomenological psychology, deriving from the fact that both 
investigate the same field of inquiry, only from a different perspective. Whether the 
phenomenologist’s perspective is based on the natural attitude or not will depend on 
her philosophical motivation, i.e. on what goal she has chosen for her investigation. 
The practiced phenomenologist, however, is able to shift from any phenomenologi-
cal consideration relying on the natural attitude to a correspondent one that is not, 
i.e. she will be able to appropriate any psychological proposition from a transcen-
dental perspective and vice versa. As Husserl puts it in a passage underscored by 
Merleau-Ponty: “To every eidetic, as well as to every empirical, constatation on the 
one side, a parallel must correspond on the other side.”9 Accordingly, if develop-
mental science helps achieve a result in phenomenological psychology, it will have 
facilitated achieving the correspondent result in transcendental phenomenology. 
The practiced phenomenologist will need only the suitable change of attitude to re-
appropriate the result in a transcendental perspective.
Both psychological and transcendental phenomenologies include investigations 
of the genesis, or origins, of specific types of lived experience. A genetic investi-
gation seeks to determine how the development of consciousness across time has 
brought about a specific type of lived experience. In other words, genetic phenom-
enology explains how lived experiences can come about based on past experience, 
affects, acts, associations, and various kinds of subjective processes. In the genetic 
context, the phenomenologist faces classical problems in psychology: how does a 
subject acquire “‘the idea of space,’ the ‘idea of time,’ the ‘idea of a physical thing,’ 
and so forth.”10 These are some of the same questions tackled by developmental 
science. The connections between phenomenology and developmental science are 
most evident in reference to genetic phenomenology, and in this paper we focus on 
genetic phenomenology to throw light on those connections.
There are various forms of intentionality that present us with the lived experi-
ences of others. Some are perceptual and directly present us with the subjective 
meaning of others’ expressive behaviors. This intuitive access to other people’s 
experiences often depends on our past perception of people and on our present 
knowledge of the context. We are presented with others’ experiences through our 
understanding of their verbal communication or through suppositions we make in 
trying to interpret behaviors hard to decipher. All these forms of intentionality have 
7 Husserl (1999).
8 Husserl (1989; 1997).
9 Husserl (1989, p. 414) and Merleau-Ponty (1964, p. 72).
10 Husserl (1999, p. 76).
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various degrees of certainty. When we investigate facts of consciousness guided by a 
scientific interest we are practicing empirical phenomenology.11
There are developmentalists who investigate conscious experience in the early 
stages of human life,12 but most cognitive developmental psychologists would say 
that their research is about behavior or cognition, not consciousness. If one seeks to 
determine how cognitive developmental psychology can connect with phenomenol-
ogy, it has to be assumed that the results of cognitive psychology can be indicative 
of the lived experience of infants. Both cognitive process in cognitive science and 
lived experience in phenomenology have an indispensable relation with behavior. 
Cognitive processes explain behavioral findings. Behavior expresses lived experi-
ence.13 Therefore, cognitive processes and lived experience are linked in that the 
former explain behaviors that express the latter. Even developmentalists like Gopnik 
and Meltzoff, who deny the importance of considerations about consciousness for 
cognitive psychology, end up supposing that infant behavior is often expressive of 
lived experience corresponding to the cognitive process they postulate.14
When we determine what experiences infants live through based on specific 
results in cognitive psychology, we are undertaking a kind of phenomenology. This 
developmental phenomenology is not based on reflection on one’s own experiences, 
which infants cannot yet verbally report, but crucially relies on the interpretation 
of third person data. For this reason, it can be described as “constructive.” In this 
respect developmental phenomenology is a constructive empirical genetic form of 
phenomenological psychology. Here are some general traits of how it might work.
First of all, we have a natural perception of infants as minded beings. Whether 
one is a cognitivist psychologist or phenomenologist or parent, one cannot help 
perceiving the behavior of infants as expressive of lived experience. One of the 
tenets of phenomenology is the reevaluation of lifeworld knowledge: without ordi-
nary experience of the world scientific knowledge would not be possible and would 
lose its meaning.15 It is also a paradigmatic assumption of cognitive science that 
our basic cognitive processes are veridical.16 Hence developmental phenomenology 
should take its departure from our immediate experience of the subjective meaning 
of infants’ behavior and even consider it a source of knowledge, although one that 
must be examined critically and as rigorously as possible. For example, we cannot 
assume that infants’ expressions have the same social meaning of similar expres-
sions we perceive in adults; yet refraining from interpreting those expressions as 
expressive of some kind of lived experience would be unreasonable.
Intuitive access to lived experience does not take one far beyond the attribution of 
basic intentions, emotions, perceptions, and attentive concern. More complex expe-
riential processes are more ambiguously expressed. One needs to examine infant 
14 Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997, pp. 22–23).
15 Merleau-Ponty (2012).
16 Gopnik and Meltzoff (1997, pp. 15–20).
11 Husserl (1989, pp. 409–411, 1997, p. 176, 1999, pp. 69–70).
12 Trevarthen and Reddy (2007).
13 Merleau-Ponty (1963, 2012).
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behavior in a thoughtful reflective manner and needs data capable of distinguish-
ing between different hypotheses. Hence the connection with cognitive psychol-
ogy, which provides quantitative behavioral data from infants in strategic, highly 
controlled situations. Results obtained in this way are often generalizable and can 
ground reasonable inferences to the domain of lived experience. The plausibility of 
a developmental phenomenological hypothesis depends primarily on the extent to 
which it accords with behavioral findings.
Furthermore, there must be at least a plausible interpretation of the neuroscientific 
data that is compatible with the developmental phenomenological hypothesis in ques-
tion. For example, the hypothesis that the human newborn is endowed with lived expe-
rience is supported by a large variety of neuroscientific and behavioral findings.17
Lastly, developmental phenomenology will try to make the most of the concep-
tual tools inherited from the phenomenological tradition. There is a vast scientific 
literature attributing consciousness to organisms very different from adult human 
beings: fish, arthropods, and octopuses.18 Just as in the case of the reconstruction 
of infant experience, this literature urges the clarification of what minimal forms 
of consciousness may be like. The phenomenological tradition has elaborated, for 
example, a notion of pre-reflective, bodily, transitory, present-focused, quick-forgot-
ten (and in a sense irretrievable) lived experience that may be applicable to cogni-
tively simple organisms.19
2.2  Exemplifying the relevance of developmental science: infant social cognition
In this section, we put forward an example of the relevance of developmental sci-
ence to phenomenology. The example concerns the problem of explaining the most 
primitive and fundamental access to other minds. The phenomenological proposal in 
this regard consists in the idea—known as Direct Social Perception (DSP)—that the 
most fundamental access to other minds is direct and perceptual.20
Phenomenology concurs with Piaget and cognitive science that the perception of an 
ordinary (cultural) object “at a glance” entails assimilating sensory configurations to 
experience-originated perceptual schemas.21 This one-shot perceptual categorization 
implies a previous “institution” of the global schema and a similarity-based apprehen-
sion.22 Furthermore, assimilation entails accommodation. Take Husserl’s example. A 
child experiences for the first time the meaning of a pair of scissors. At a later time, the 
child sees a pair of scissors she has never seen before and that nobody is using. The 
child recognizes the object at first glance as scissors, although its physical properties 
are somewhat different from the pair(s) of scissors experienced in the past. Differently 
from what was experienced before, this pair is thinner, metallic colored, smoother, etc. 
17 Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay (2013).
18 Allen and Trestman (2017).
19 Gallagher and Zahavi (2012).
20 Gallagher and Zahavi (2012).
21 Piaget 1954 and Vincini and Jhang (2018).
22 Husserl (1999, p. 111).
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This means that certain elements of the global meaning previously experienced have 
been transferred to the present stimulus (in particular, its usability to cut paper; its gen-
eral shape that affords grasping in a way relevant to its use), but others (e.g. specific 
dimensions, color, decorations) are not, because they are not compatible with what 
is given in the stimulus. Past elements are accommodated or adapted to the present 
stimulus in the sense that the elements incompatible with it are discounted.
We can note two further points of convergence with developmental psychology. 
First, object-perception requires bodily action. Perceptual assimilation is part and 
parcel of the sense making activity of the subject, aimed at satisfying vital concerns. 
Second, object perception originates in part from stimulus-driven sensory organiza-
tion. Husserl designated these processes as “passive syntheses” (involving similar-
ity, fusion, contrast, etc.). In accord with this, developmental psychology abandoned 
the image of the newborn experiencing a “blooming, buzzing confusion” and came 
to identify processes of stimulus-based, automatic perceptual organization.23 New-
borns (and late term fetuses) can discriminate between different shapes and voices, 
recognize them across time, recognize intermodal features, and are sensitive to 
Gestalt principles.24 The sensory experience of newborns includes diachronic and 
synchronic unities that affect the infant emotionally.25
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty suggest that the notion of “pairing” accounts for how 
infants come to experience other minds in the first place.26 Pairing is a process of 
reciprocal similarity-based apprehension of self and other: because the same or 
similar features are experienced in self and other, the self tends to be experienced 
in light of the other,27 and the other in light of the self. Pairing accounts for the 
perception of other minds as a similarity-based apprehension: having experienced 
characteristic features of embodied animacy, emotions, intentions, and perceptions 
in myself, in so far as the other’s body presents the same or similar features, I tend 
to perceive it as embodying animacy, emotions, intentions, and perceptions.28 As 
indicated above, the nature of the apprehended unit, i.e. the other’s body, dictates 
constraints on assimilation. Pairing presupposes that my lived body is experienced 
as the center of spatial orientations, the “here,” and that the other’s body constitutes 
one of the many “theres.” Thus, the assimilative apprehension is constrained by the 
others’ body character as “there.” If the other’s intentions, for example, were first-
personally experienced, I would have to experience the other’s body as my own and 
as a center of orientations, as the “here.” But this cannot occur because it is incom-
patible with my experience of the other’s body as a “there.”29 Therefore, pairing 
requires that others’ intentions are either second or third-personally experienced.
29 Husserl (1999, pp. 118–119).
23 Streri et al. (2013) and Quinn and Bhatt (2009).
24 Hepper (2015) and Simion et al. (2011).
25 Husserl 1973.
26 Husserl (1999) and Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2010, 2012).
27 Merleau-Ponty (1964, pp. 145–148).
28 De Preester (2008) and Zahavi (2012).
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A variety of findings in contemporary developmental psychology suggests that 
pairing is a viable hypothesis for how infants come to perceive other minds.30 In the 
domain where empirical research is most advanced, i.e. action perception, there is 
even an eminent developmental-psychological theory that is essentially equivalent 
to the notion of pairing.31 Pairing may be facilitated not just through domain-gen-
eral affects that pull the infant into interaction with the caregiver, but also by means 
of innate needs for proper social relations.32 Indeed, in general, the features of the 
stimuli soliciting a specific perceptual apprehension reflect criteria of (affective) rel-
evance. If certain features make possible a pairing apprehension of the other in one 
circumstance, they acquire a vital relevance for the infant—who needs proper social 
relations—and will solicit pairing in other circumstances too, even if the new cir-
cumstances present other features that would not by themselves facilitate the percep-
tion of other minds (as occurs when infants perceive inanimate objects as animate).
If the phenomenologist is sympathetic with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s rich 
analyses of embodied perception and has surveyed the applicability of the notion 
of pairing to early development (as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty did), she may be 
tempted to feel satisfied with the pairing solution to the problem of the most fun-
damental experience of other minds. This satisfaction is challenged, however, by 
the widespread nativist approach of contemporary cognitive psychology.33 This 
approach postulates a specialized module selected in the course of evolution that 
allows infants to infer and reason about others’ mental states (sometimes on the 
basis of the innate knowledge of the principles of rational agency). The module is 
supposed to operate without any necessary reference to self-other similarity. For our 
purposes we can set aside the question of whether this approach is warranted by 
empirical findings. The phenomenologist should consider all possible explanations 
for a specific kind of phenomenon. Thus, the mere fact that there is a theoretical 
approach which dispenses with similarity-based apprehension obligates the phe-
nomenologist to ponder the possibility of a primitive experience of other minds that 
is explained by something other than pairing.
In this way, the phenomenologist who is willing to maintain the idea of direct 
social perception (DSP) may consider the possibility of an innate perception of other 
minds as one form of DSP that does not presuppose self-other similarity or a pairing 
process. The object of this form of innate perception—i.e. what appears to the infant 
through the perception—would be the same as that of the similarity-based apprehen-
sion of the other in the pairing process. For example, both innate perception and 
pairing present a movement as goal-directed. The difference between the two is that 
the innate presentation of the intention is, from a phenomenological perspective, an 
“unanalyzable factum brutum.”34 Innate perception could only be considered as a 
primitive fact in the domain of consciousness. The maximum that can be said is that 
30 Vincini (2020).
31 Gerson and Woodward (2010).
32 Gallese (2009).
33 Baillargeon et al. (2016).
34 Zahavi (2012, p. 234).
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the perception of another’s intention or emotion is bestowed on a certain configura-
tion of sensory experience.
In contrast to innate perception, the pairing presentation of someone else’s inten-
tion or emotion is brought about by the activation of a content of past experience 
(e.g. goal-directedness) through association by similarity. Therefore, it is explain-
able as the result of the associative process combining sensory appearances with 
past experience. As noted above, the process is assimilative and accommodative, 
i.e. it adapts the reactivated content to the constraints of the apprehended unit—e.g. 
that the apprehended body is not mine. We emphasize that the associative process 
at work both in ordinary object perception and pairing regulates the genesis of con-
scious experience, but is not itself a conscious process. When I see a coffee mug, I 
have no awareness of the associative process with my past experience of mugs; I can 
become conscious of it only through phenomenological reflection. Analogously, in 
pairing the other’s mind appears without any awareness of an association with first-
person embodied experience. For this reason, the percept of pairing and innate per-
ception can be said to be the same: e.g., someone else’s intention or emotion, despite 
involving different processes.
Accordingly, from a phenomenological perspective, there is no reason to exclude 
the possibility of innate perception. Hence the possibility of innate perception has a 
remarkable implication for the analysis of the essential features of the basic percep-
tual experience of other minds: namely, in this regard, pairing is certainly a possibil-
ity, but does not represent an essential necessity. The spread of nativism in cogni-
tive psychology makes it impossible for a present-day phenomenologist to neglect 
this possibility. Here we see an example of the relevance of cognitive developmental 
psychology for phenomenology.
In our analysis the notion of innate perception has been operating so far at the 
psychological level. However, one can reanimate the epistemological motivations 
for assuming the transcendental attitude and formulate the transcendental implica-
tion of the possibility of innate perception: the perception of a body as expressive of 
mind can occur initially without any rational ground in the experience of the indi-
vidual; it is up to the successive course of experience to confirm or disconfirm the 
positing of mind inherent to the initial perception.
The significance of this consideration can be highlighted through the contrast 
with the notion of pairing. Pairing represents the possibility that even the initial per-
ception of other minds be rationally grounded. In phenomenology, one of the crite-
ria for the rational character of an existential positing is the concordance of a plural-
ity of appearances.35 Even if I see the coffee mug only from one perspective and at 
a glance, my perceptual belief in its existence (rather than the existence of a ball, a 
radio, or nothing on the table) is grounded in the concordance (similarity) of current 
and previous appearances. Analogously, the pairing interpretation of another body 
as animate is grounded by the concordance with the experience of my own animate 
body. Evidently, the rationality of the initial positing does not dispense with the 
35 Husserl (1989, pp. 234–235).
1 3
Developmental phenomenology: examples from social cognition 
necessity of verification in the successive course of experience. But the difference in 
rational, or epistemic, groundedness between pairing and innate perception reminds 
us that if developmental science motivates a phenomenological consideration at the 
psychological level, it facilitates the parallel transcendental consideration as well 
(always on the condition that one is willing to shift to the transcendental attitude).
Importantly, even if phenomenology needs to distinguish pairing and innate per-
ception for all the foregoing reasons, it is certainly possible to use them as comple-
mentary notions to account for socio-cognitive development. Infants may come to 
perceive some mental states of others through innate perceptions and others through 
pairing, or they may come to perceive others first through innate perception and then 
extend the scope of this perception through pairing, etc. It is empirical research, 
phenomenologically enlightened, that has to determine whether and how the two 
notions have to be combined in a unitary explanation of the developmental emer-
gence of the earliest access to other minds.
3  The relevance of phenomenology to developmental science
3.1  Pragmatic considerations
There is a pragmatic approach for putting phenomenology into use in cognitive psy-
chology. Both cognitive psychology and phenomenology use terms from ordinary 
language: “perception,” “association,” “action,” “emotion,” “solicitation,” “assimi-
lation,” “accommodation,” etc. Some expressions are more frequent in psychology 
than in phenomenology, e.g. (perceptual) “generalization,” or vice versa, e.g. (per-
ceptual) “apprehension.” Both a phenomenologist and a cognitive psychologist can 
understand how the processes these terms designate can fulfill a function for the 
concrete subjects under consideration (infants)—and, to clarify this function, they 
do not need to explain to one another the methodological or theoretical assumptions 
consolidated in their respective traditions. The pragmatic and direct approach, then, 
consists in working with notions and theories from the phenomenological tradition 
to describe cognitive processes. These notions and theories would aim at making 
behavior intelligible from a scientific standpoint and to a scientific audience, with-
out raising phenomenological issues about the status of lived experience. In other 
words, some phenomenological notions and theories can be put forward on a par 
with alternative cognitive-psychological models and compete with them on their 
ground, i.e. that of empirical adequacy, the explanation and prediction of behavior 
and biological (neuroscientific) plausibility.
Vincini and Jhang followed this strategy with regard to a specific phenomenon 
debated in developmental psychology.36 They formulated a cognitive model of neo-
natal imitation availing themselves of the way the notion of “association by similar-
ity” is used in phenomenology. They argued that their hypothesis accounted for the 
extant findings better than alterative models and suggested further ways to test their 
36 Vincini and Jhang (2018).
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hypothesis empirically. Arguably, this is the route that a phenomenological concep-
tion of DSP has to take if it wishes to become a competitive model in cognitive 
psychology. There are already some developmentalists who would endorse DSP as 
the basic way of accessing other minds,37 but what could convince cognitive psy-
chologists to take DSP seriously if not its capacity to explain and predict empirical 
findings?
Proposing a phenomenological model for a developmental phenomenon entails 
three steps. The first step is to show that the model can account for the extant find-
ings. The second step is to criticize cognitivist interpretations of the behavioral find-
ings that could undermine the phenomenological model. The third step consists in 
specifying the ways the model can be tested so that it may actually inform empiri-
cal research. Such a step is called “front-loaded phenomenology.”38 In Sect. 2.2, we 
examine the question of how DSP could be front-loaded.
We note that the phenomenological approach accentuates a heuristic use of imag-
ination already present in the developmental literature. For example, Heyes suggests 
that we have to “imagine the infant’s experience” in order to formulate alterna-
tives to nativist cognitivist explanations of the experimental findings.39 Her use of 
imagination is far from being a superficial reiteration of common sense; rather, it 
is a theory-loaded exercise that requires her to “resist the intuitive pull of [nativ-
ist mentalistic] interpretations.” Heyes’ deflationary interpretation, however, may be 
closer to a phenomenological account than cognitive nativism, which tends to reject 
phenomenological constraints in so far as these are incompatible with its theoretical 
assumptions (which frame the experiments). The deflationary interpretation derives, 
in part, from the attempt to explain the findings in a way that is consistent with a 
plausible phenomenological reconstruction of infant experience. Nonetheless, from 
a phenomenologically-informed enactivist perspective, perception is always action-
oriented because it serves the vital and affective functions of the organism. This con-
trasts with the deflationary emphasis on low-level perceptual properties (“shapes,” 
“colors,” “speed,” etc.) that cannot affect infant behavior by themselves, but only 
insofar as they relate to infants’ interests and needs. The nexus between perception 
and affectivity must be made explicit.40
3.2  Preliminaries for front‑loading DSP
Front-loading phenomenology is possible as a collaborative enterprise with experi-
mental psychologists who share theoretical inclinations and intents. The phenom-
enologist can interact and exchange ideas with the developmentalist in a way that the 
final product will likely be different from what either could have imagined without 
the collaboration. In this section, we describe some lines of research in developmen-
tal science where the phenomenologist could engage with empirical issues through 
37 Astington and Hughes (2013).
38 Gallagher and Zahavi (2012).
39 Heyes (2014, p. 649).
40 Gallagher (2015).
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a strategy of front-loading the DSP framework, contributing to the design of experi-
ments in a productive manner.
As indicated above, the DSP view can sustain two contrasting (or complemen-
tary) hypotheses, i.e., innate perception and pairing. Innate perception can be taken 
to account for the cases of DSP that cannot be explained through pairing. When 
there is no possible similarity between a previously experienced state and a per-
ceived state DSP must be innate. Yet, this signals a problem. Independently of the 
notion of pairing, the literature has not specified which stimuli solicit a DSP and 
which do not. In contrast, cognitivist nativism has identified in a detailed manner a 
number of stimulus features that are supposed to provoke the attribution of a low-
level intention. This precise identification is what has made it possible to formulate 
experiments that test cognitivist nativist hypotheses. Indeed, a typical experiment 
entails comparing a condition that is supposed to solicit goal attribution with con-
trol conditions that are not. In this respect, it seems that innate perception depends 
entirely on cognitive nativism or on hypotheses that do not derive from phenom-
enological reflection (e.g. evolutionary hypotheses). Can phenomenology establish 
some criteria for the kind of stimuli to be innately perceived as minded beings? Are 
there phenomenological constraints on the nature of this class of stimuli? An answer 
to this question, which remains unresolved, is important if a phenomenological 
account of innate perception seeks to actively contribute to empirical research.
The same problem does not arise for the notion of pairing. This notion implies 
reference to first-person experience, although it allows for rapid generalization and 
for the indispensable cases in which external perception induces a new configuration 
of elements that have been experienced first-personally only in separate occasions. 
At least initially, an infant perceives another’s intentions or emotions or global ani-
macy only insofar as the other’s behavior presents features the infant has already 
lived through in her own experience. This kind of restriction of the relevant stim-
uli has made possible the impressive literature on developmental action-perception 
mirroring. Part of the mirroring literature attests in a particularly cogent way to the 
causal nexus between action experience and action perception.41
It is self-other similarity that empirical research, aimed at testing a pairing 
account of infant DSP, would bring to the fore. One way to do it is to investigate 
imitation and imitation recognition from an ideomotor perspective, which also pos-
tulates a  “functional role  for [self-other] similarity.”42 Beyond the still ambiguous 
issue of neonatal imitation, there are findings on the imitation of vocalizations and 
(hand, head, body-directed, etc.) actions from 2 to 9 months.43 Nonetheless, it would 
be helpful if future research strengthened these findings, especially with regard to 
imitation recognition from 2-6 months, which is the period in which DSP (on the 
pairing account) is first likely to occur.
The recognition of being imitated, or better, the recognition of same or similar 
features in the gestures of self and others, can be inferred from measuring the infant 
41 Gerson and Woodward (2010).
42 Prinz (2002, p. 160).
43 Gratier (2014) and Nadel et al. (2004).
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responses to being imitated: gesture rates, reciprocal imitation (imitation of the 
adult’s imitation of the infant), positive emotional expressions, staring from object to 
adult, and stop acting as well as the effects on the duration and quality of the interac-
tion. It is important to compare these measurements to control conditions where the 
adult executes merely contingent (instead of imitative) gestures. Indeed, one needs 
to differentiate responses to similar actions from responses to actions that merely 
happen at the same time. Notably during interaction parents imitate infants once per 
minute44 or from 200 to 400 times per day.45 Therefore, showing that infants are sen-
sitive to self-other similarities when being imitated is a considerable step in showing 
how pairing actually occurs.
Another way to find support for a pairing account is to investigate responses to 
stimuli that vary in their similarity to the infants’ own gestures. For example, in rela-
tion to the infants’ own vocalizations, the stimulus can vary from a recording of 
the infant’s own voice to another infant’s voice, an adult’s voice, and a non-human 
sound. The preferential response can be quantified by associating the stimulus with 
a physiological response or the (rate of) production of an action like sucking, look-
ing, or limb movement. The infant would produce the associated actions to pro-
long exposure to the preferred stimulus. The pairing account would find support if, 
especially in the crucial period from 2 to 6  months, one could detect differential 
responses based on the similarity with the infant’s own vocalizations.
Other experiments of this kind would focus on proprioceptive-visual recogni-
tion, a key indicator of the possibility of early pairing. For instance, it would be 
important to establish the motivation of infants’ positive reaction to seeing them-
selves in the mirror starting at 3 months of age. One of the most well-known con-
temporary models of imitation development, associative sequence learning (ASL), 
suggests that infants’ positive reactions are motivated by the contingent character 
of the visual stimulus; indeed, ASL supposes that infant experiences with mirrors 
contributes to establishing an association between visually perceived actions and 
corresponding self-produced actions via contiguity and contingency—but not via 
similarity.46 Showing that infants’ positive reactions depend on the presence of the 
same morpho-kinetic features in proprioceptively experienced and perceived actions 
would constitute a further argument for the possibility of early pairing. This may be 
done by means of an apparatus that is not only capable of generating a mirror image, 
but also a modified image that presents the same contingency of the mirror image 
but decreases the level of similarity of the gestures. If infants exhibit a decrease of 
positive reactions in correlation with the modified image, it is because they register 
the decrease of similarity over and beyond the contingent character of the image. In 
this way, infants would demonstrate their sensitivity to the similarity of the mirror 
image.
Phenomenologically understood, emotion perception (or “emotion recogni-
tion”) is not just an adaptive reaction to the embodied emotion of the other, but the 
44 Ray and Heyes (2011).
45 Jones and Yoshida (2011).
46 Ray and Heyes (2011).
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perception of an emotion as belonging to the body “over there” (that is not my body 
“here” through which I live my emotions). Vaillant-Molina et al. demonstrated that 
5-month-olds could match the perceived vocal expressions of an emotion of another 
infant with the silent video of the facial expressions of the same emotion.47 The 
video and the sound were not contingent, but they presented the same emotional 
valence. On a conservative interpretation, an infant could match the two stimuli 
because they had the same kind of emotional effect on her (e.g. positive instead of 
negative). Even if this is correct, infants must have been sensitive to the features of 
the stimulus expressing the emotion. In a pairing account, infants come to recognize 
another’s emotion because they have lived through the same kind of emotion and 
embodied it in a similar manner. This implies that embodying one’s own emotions 
and expressing them through physical features should make one sensitive to external 
stimuli presenting similar features. Hence one could vary the kinds of stimuli pre-
sented in a matching task from the infant’s own expressions to other infants’ expres-
sions, adults’ expressions of the same emotions embodied by infants, adult emotions 
not embodied by infants, etc. One could test whether the difficulty of the match-
ing task is inversely proportional to the similarity with the infant’s own expressions. 
Furthermore, it would be important to identify in a detailed manner the physical 
features expressing an emotion in infants, as Vaillant-Molina et al. began to do (e.g. 
associating happiness with softer, more gradual changes). This would allow one to 
predict in what circumstances emotion recognition is facilitated.
Plausibly, the primary locus of pairing is infant-caregiver interaction. This means 
that in early “proto-conversations” infants experience features common to self and 
others so that they start perceiving others as minded beings. As Fuchs and De Jae-
gher put it, self and other “resonate” with each other.48 Consistent with assigning 
social interaction an indispensable role, extant studies already indicate that infant-
caregiver coordination at 4 months predicts cognition and attachment at 12 months 
and that the degree of affective mirroring displayed by mothers predicts the social 
deployment of attention at 5 and 10 months.49
A pairing account predicts that the more a social interaction presents self-other 
commonalities, the more it will facilitate the perception of others’ intentions and 
emotions. For this reason, it is important to identify the self-other commonalities 
that can be present in social exchanges such as: the character of the sounds pro-
duced, morpho-kinetic aspects of gestures proprioceptively and visually experi-
enced, playing similar roles (initiating, maintaining, varying, terminating the affec-
tive tone of the interaction), contingency of one’s gestures on the other’s gestures, 
turn taking, bodily orientation, and being in the same place as part of the same tem-
porally extended interaction. Infants who engage in interactions with a high level of 
self-other commonalities should perform better in a task that measures the percep-
tion of others’ intentions and emotions. For instance, they could perform better in a 
48 Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009).
49 Legerstee (2005, pp. 153–158).
47 Vaillant-Molina et al. (2013).
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task like Woodward’s, where infants have to show sensitivity to a change of goal.50 
It is true that interaction primarily promotes the global perception of the other as 
a minded being, but we reason that, if this truly happens, it will also facilitate the 
perception of the other’s goal. Analogously, the time an infant spends in social inter-
actions and how imitative her parents are should correlate with performance in a 
change of goal task at 5–6 months.
On this matter, cross-cultural studies can be highly significant: cultures where 
caregivers interact less with infants or interact in a manner that generates less self-
other commonalities for the infant should present a delay in a social perception task. 
Moreover, a central role for the development of pairing must be assigned to vocali-
zations, given their importance in proto-conversations.51 One possible consequence 
is that deaf infants may show a delay in social perception. Meristo et al.’s report that 
deaf infants did not pass the spontaneous-response test on the comprehension of oth-
ers’ false beliefs, as opposed to hearing infants, is noteworthy.52 Meristo et al.’s own 
interpretation focuses on early social interaction.
Finally, attempts at reproducing in the emotion perception domain a counterpart 
of the findings on mirroring in action perception development would support a pair-
ing account. These attempts would relate first-person emotion experience to emo-
tion recognition, investigating first of all if the former precedes the latter (keeping 
in mind the distinction between emotional reaction and emotion recognition). In a 
playful and joyful face-to-face interaction parents often act as mirrors to infants: 
they produce matching facial and vocal gestures (smiles, laughs, mouth and head 
movements, etc.). The amount of time that infants spend in these and other playful 
interactions where infants and parents jointly act with objects should correlate with 
results on tests of emotion recognition or that rely in part on emotion recognition. 
Indeed, neural mirroring could be taken to be indicative of emotion recognition, 
as well as the capacity to expect a specific behavior toward an object after having 
attended to the (positive or negative) emotion of another subject.53
4  Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the mutual enlightenment between phenomenol-
ogy and developmental science with regard to the problem of the most fundamental 
access to other minds. In cognitive psychology, nativism is one of the main currents 
when it comes to the attribution of intentions and emotions. Nativism affirms that 
early attribution occurs without an association by similarity with the infant’s own 
experiences. Therefore, contemporary psychology provides a strong impulse to con-
ceive of a counterpart of nativism in developmental phenomenology. Unlike Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty, the contemporary phenomenologist can no longer neglect the 
50 Woodward (1998).
51 Husserl (1973, pp. 606–607, 1989, p. 101).
52 Meristo et al.’s (2016).
53 Reschke et al. (2017).
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possibility that the fundamental access to other minds may be an innate perception. 
From the phenomenological point of view, it would simply be an unanalyzable fact 
that specific configurations of sensory experiences solicit the perception of some-
one else’s intentions or emotions. The phenomenologist can shift from the natural to 
the transcendental attitude and recognize the possibility that the initial perception of 
other minds lacks epistemic ground, though it can acquire it in the successive course 
of experience. Hence the debate about infant social perception is an example of how 
developmental science can push the phenomenologist to consider possibilities she 
may not have considered otherwise.
Phenomenology can go beyond the necessary evaluation and reinterpretation 
of experimental results. In a pragmatic approach, some phenomenological notions 
and theories can be put forward on a par with alternative cognitive-psychological 
models and compete with them on the ground of empirical adequacy. For exam-
ple, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pairing can constitute an account of how 
infants come to perceive others’ mental states and contribute to empirical research. 
It motivates various investigations focusing on self-other similarity in the vocal and 
proprioceptive-visual domains. Decreasing the extent to which stimuli are similar to 
the infant’s own embodied experiences should decrease recognition responses. Var-
ying the degree of similarity should facilitate the matching of expressive visual and 
auditory stimuli. Pairing also promotes the study of infant-caregiver interaction. It 
encourages research on the correlation between the time spent in social interaction, 
the extent to which interaction presents self-other commonalities, and the emotional 
tone of interaction with infant performance on tasks indicative of the perception of 
others’ intentions or emotions. In this case, front-loading phenomenology means 
that the phenomenologist—making use of the notion of pairing—collaborates with 
developmental psychologists in order to produce innovative findings in the field of 
infant social perception.
Our example has focused on direct social perception; a similar kind of mutual 
enlightenment is possible with regard to knowledge of higher order mental states, 
norms, social institutions, etc. Or one could take up in this interdisciplinary manner 
the problems mentioned by Husserl concerning the origins of “‘the idea of space,’ 
the ‘idea of time,’ the ‘idea of a physical thing.’” There are many areas where the 
interaction between phenomenology and developmental science can be explored: 
indeed, it can be done for all kinds of objects of knowledge and for the entire life-
world. For all the big issues common to the two fields, there are the following ques-
tions to be pursued: does developmental science confirm what we predict on the 
basis of the insights found in the phenomenological tradition? Does it promote new 
phenomenological insights? Can phenomenology guide the production of novel 
empirical data? The project thus envisaged is to pursue these questions in a system-
atic manner.
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